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Abstract 
R&D collaboration facilitates the pooling of complementary skills, learning from the partner as 
well as the sharing of risks and costs. Research therefore repeatedly stresses the positive 
relationship between collaborative R&D and innovation performance. Fewer studies address 
the potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. Collaborative R&D comes at the cost of 
coordination and monitoring, requires knowledge disclosure and involves the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the partners. Thus, while for lower collaboration intensities the net 
gains can be high, costs may start to outweigh benefits if firms perform a higher share of their 
innovation projects collaboratively. For a sample of 2,735 firms located in Germany and active 
in a broad range of manufacturing and service sectors, this study finds that increasing the share 
of collaborative R&D projects in total R&D projects is associated with a higher probability of 
product innovation and with a higher market success of new products. While this confirms 
previous findings on the gains for innovation performance, we also observe that collaboration 
has decreasing and even negative returns on product innovation if its intensity increases above 
a certain threshold. Thus, the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation 
follows an inverted-U shape and, on average, costs start to outweigh benefits if a firm pursues 
more than about two-thirds of its R&D projects in collaboration. This result is robust to 
conditioning market success to the introduction of new products and to accounting for the 
selection into collaborating. This threshold is, however, contingent on firm characteristics. 
Smaller and younger as well as resource constrained firms benefit from relatively higher 
collaboration intensities. For firms with higher collaboration complexities in terms of different 
partners and different stages of the R&D process at which collaboration takes place, returns 
start to decrease already at lower collaboration intensities.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on R&D partnerships repeatedly stresses the virtues of collaborative innovation. The 
pooling of complementary competencies, skill sourcing, and learning from the partner are all 
means through which partnering firms gain (Shan et al. 1994; Hagedoorn 1993; Powell et al. 
1996; Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006; Zidorn and Wagner 2013). A large number of studies have 
identified positive effects on innovation performance, suggesting that the potential gains 
through collaborative innovation projects are high (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999; Van 
Ophem et al. 2001; Branstetter and Sakakibara 2002; Faems et al. 2005, among others).  
Less research has addressed the potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. In a broader 
context, studies have shown that searching for external knowledge from a variety of sources is 
only beneficial up to a certain point. Expanding the search beyond a threshold may result in 
“over-searching” (March 1991; Katila and Ahuja 2002; Laursen and Salter 2006, Grimpe and 
Kaiser 2010). Similar reasoning may hold for collaboration. R&D collaboration usually 
requires active commitment of the partners and the net returns from the partnership may depend 
on the firm’s capacity to handle such commitments. As long as the benefits from collaborating 
outweigh the costs, a firm’s innovation performance will increase with its collaboration 
intensity. After a certain threshold, however, this may no longer be the case. Thus, even though 
collaboration may positively influence innovation performance initially, engaging in additional 
collaborative projects may exhibit diminishing or even negative returns (Deeds and Hill 1996). 
The reasons are twofold: First, collaboration comes at the cost of coordination and monitoring 
(Rosenberg 1982; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). Second, collaboration involves knowledge 
disclosure and the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners (Foray and Steinmüller 2003; 
Bader 2008; Bogers 2011). Yet, the benefits and costs of collaboration may be highly firm-
specific, depending on characteristics such as maturity or experience, availability of resources, 
and the alliance portfolio of the firm. For instance, gains from collaboration are potentially 
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highest for firms with limited internal resources, such as small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), 
younger firms or firms that are overall financially constrained (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a; 
Lavie et al. 2010; Beckman et al. 2004). Moreover, SMEs or young firms may particularly 
benefit from collaboration through access to a broader and more diversified knowledge base 
(Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014a). On the downside, SMEs and younger firms tend to be 
more resource constrained and may be required to budget managerial attention and available 
internal financial resources carefully. Therefore, the cost of coordination and monitoring may 
be especially high for such firms. Similarly, the competitive environment in which a firm 
operates may affect the benefits and costs of collaboration (Lavie et al. 2010). The cost of 
disclosure may be higher for firms in highly competitive markets in which information leakage 
quickly translates into a loss of market share. Finally, collaboration complexity in terms of 
diversification of partners and the variety of stages of R&D projects at which a firm collaborates 
may impact the gains and pains from collaboration. High complexity may increase management 
and coordination challenges, thereby reducing the net returns of collaboration (Leiponen and 
Helfat 2010; Beck and Schenker-Wicki 2014; van Beers and Zand 2014). Consequently, the 
relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation may not be linear, but may follow 
an inverted-U shape with the turning point depending on firm and market characteristics.  
The present study addresses the gains and pains from collaborative R&D empirically. Our 
analysis puts forward the proposition that the effect of collaboration depends on its intensity, 
that is, on the number R&D partnerships in total R&D projects. For a sample of 2,735 firms 
located in Germany, we indeed find that increasing the share of collaborative projects in total 
projects is associated with a higher probability of product innovation and with a higher market 
success of new products. However, we find that, on average, this relationship turns negative for 
collaboration intensities higher than approximately 60% of all innovation projects. This 
threshold, however, varies according to firm characteristics, with the turning point ranging from 
45% of collaboration intensity for financially well-endowed firms to circa 80% for young firms.  
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These results are robust to conditioning market success to the introduction of new products 
and to accounting for the selection into collaboration. Additionally, while many studies 
interested in external knowledge sourcing or the collaborative behavior of firms focus on 
particular industries, predominantly the pharmaceutical or semi-conductor sector, our study 
considers a sample that is more representative of the economy, comprising high-, medium and 
low-tech manufacturing and services. 
The results of our study have implications for R&D management as well as for innovation 
policy. From a managerial perspective, it may seem rational to engage in collaborative R&D as 
opportunities for doing so open up. Overconfidence with regard to the expected returns from 
each of these relationships may lead to the engagement in more alliances than are actually 
beneficial. It thus seems advisable to balance collaborative and non-collaborative projects. 
When evaluating the potential benefits from additional collaborative projects, managers may 
want to consider the firm’s overall project portfolio before deciding on future collaboration 
strategies. From a policy view, encouraging collaborative R&D may indeed foster innovation, 
which benefits not only the innovating firms but also the economy as a whole. Policy makers 
may nonetheless consider that the initial rationale of encouraging collaboration to enhance 
firms’ competitiveness, and therefore customer surplus, may be undermined if used 
excessively. This seems particularly important in light of political encouragements to foster 
further R&D partnerships through R&D subsidies or other policy tools.  
2. THE COLLABORATION – INNOVATION RELATIONSHIP  
2.1 Gains from collaboration 
There is a wide consensus in the economics and management literature that firms benefit from 
R&D collaborations. From a strategic management point of view, where collaboration and 
competition coexist, coordination, sharing of risks, resources and competencies, and the 
building of new knowledge are key channels through which firms gain from collaborating in 
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R&D (see, for instance, Caloghirou et al. 2003). In this context, the resource-based view 
suggests that in order to exploit existing resources (heterogeneous and immobile in nature) and 
in order to develop a long-term competitive advantage, firms need to also access external 
knowledge (Richardson 1972). For instance, the more basic or more radical the R&D activity, 
the higher the potential need for a diversified portfolio of collaboration partners. The 
knowledge-based view, which conceptualizes firms as mechanisms that enable knowledge 
creation, likewise asserts that R&D collaborations are a way to equip the firm with the 
knowledge it lacks internally to produce new or improved products (Un et al. 2010).   
There is indeed a whole series of empirical studies showing that collaborating firms perform 
better than non-collaborating firms, especially in terms of innovation.1 Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), for instance, were among the first to find that a firm’s propensity to patent 
is significantly higher among R&D collaborators. Similarly, Van Ophem et al. (2001) find that 
firms participating in research partnerships file more patents than firms focusing on internal 
R&D. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) find similar results for firms in government-sponsored 
research consortia in Japan. Czarnitzki and Fier (2003) and Czarnitzki et al. (2007) show that 
collaborating firms in Germany are more likely to patent than non-collaborating firms and 
Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) find a positive relationship between R&D partnerships 
and the size of firms’ patent portfolios. Studying the technological relevance of the patented 
inventions, Vanhaverbeke et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between technology 
alliances and patent citations. Finally, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014b) argue that the type 
of alliance may affect the ability and the incentives to patent, i.e., patent quality and quantity, 
differently.  
                                                 
1 Previous studies differentiate between contractual agreements between partners (see e.g., Hagedoorn et al. 2000 
and Caloghirou et al. 2003 for comprehensive overviews) or collaboration partner (see, for instance, Belderbos et 
al. 2004a; Faems et al. 2005; Knudsen 2007). 
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While patenting activity may measure inventive activities, but not necessarily new products 
or the commercial success of new products, innovation measures typically derived from survey 
data further suggest a positive relationship between R&D collaboration and successful project 
terminations, the introduction of new products, sales from product innovations as well as sales 
growth (Klomp and van Leeuwen 2001; van Leeuwen 2002; Lööf and Heshmati 2002; Janz et 
al. 2004; Belderbos et al. 2004a,b; Faems et al. 2005; Hoang and Rothaermel 2010). In 
summary, these previous findings suggest that because of the inherent benefits of collaboration, 
it is positively associated with innovation performance.   
2.2 Pains from collaboration  
Besides expected gains, however, there are also certain risks and caveats linked to R&D 
collaboration. Deeds and Hill (1996) were among the first to suggest that the collaboration-
innovation relationship may not be linear. Their results for a sample of biotechnology firms 
indeed suggest diminishing and even decreasing returns on new product development for very 
high numbers of collaborations. There could be several reasons for this observation. 
First, transaction costs economics points to the cost of collaboration when contracts are 
incomplete. Incomplete contracts typically result from poor bargaining, which is directly related 
to the specificity of the assets at stake. The higher the intangibility of an asset, the more difficult 
it becomes to formulate a complete contract (see Caloghirou et al. 2003 for a review). Since 
knowledge is a highly intangible asset (irrespective of whether it is tacit or explicit), it is 
generally very difficult to formulate complete contracts in the context of R&D collaborations. 
Hence, there is an inherent risk that R&D collaborations can become very costly if each party’s 
responsibility is not clearly specified in case of contingencies. Intuitively, this gets more 
important the higher the share of collaborative projects in a firm’s R&D project portfolio. 
Moreover, the more collaboration projects a firm engages in, the higher the likelihood that 
partners or projects of lower marginal value are among them. Previous research has shown that 
 
 
7 
 
the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the partner as well as the important costs of deterring 
such opportunistic behavior can constitute a major cause of partnership instability (Williamson 
1985; Gulati 1995; Deeds and Hill 1996).  
In addition, firms may also find it difficult to assess the partner’s value ex-ante due to 
information asymmetries and secrecy prior to the collaboration. Selecting ideal cooperation 
partners determines the degree to which complementarities in assets and know-how may 
eventually be realized. The quality of ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring may decline as 
the number of alliances increases. Thus, every (additional) collaboration increases the burden 
on management, mainly through coordination effort including monitoring and transaction costs. 
Furthermore, coordination efforts for setting up a new collaborative project, especially when 
external parties are involved, constitute a drain on the resources available for other projects, 
which may affect the firms’ overall innovation performance.  
Further, collaborative R&D naturally comes at the cost of disclosure. At least part of the 
knowledge has to be revealed to the consortium partners. Collaborating firms may transmit not 
only codified but also tacit knowledge to the partner so that leakage risks go beyond the joint 
project (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014b). Indeed, partnerships bear the inherent risk of free-
riding, where one associate tries to absorb the maximum knowledge from the other while 
concealing its own efforts (see e.g., Shapiro and Willig 1990; Baumol 1993; Kesteloot and 
Veugelers 1995). For example, partnerships with a substantial overlap in core businesses, 
geographic markets, and functional skills have a success rate of approximately only 30% as 
competitors are inclined to maximize their own individual objectives rather than the 
partnership’s interests (Lokshin et al. 2011). In the survey used for the following analysis, 
indeed 60% of all firms declare perceiving leakage of information as a reason for not engaging 
in (additional) collaboration projects. Among already collaborating firms, this share is even 
higher at more than 70%. 
 
 
8 
 
Finally, the extent to which a firm can learn from additional partners may diminish with 
the number of partners, while the outflow of their internal knowledge goes to an increasing 
number of external agents. This implies that the higher a firm’s collaboration intensity, the 
lower the marginal gain, whereas coordination costs increase.  
2.3 Conceptual framework 
Based on these arguments on the gains and pains from collaborating, we build our empirical 
model on the simple theory of a profit-maximizing firm that benefits from collaboration but 
also takes into account the transaction and disclosure costs when choosing the intensity of 
collaboration, that is, the ratio of collaborative over all innovation projects. When engaging in 
collaborative R&D, the firm realizes marginal benefits from collaboration MB. The function 
MB’s first derivate is positive (MB’ > 0), but returns are decreasing as collaboration intensity 
increases (MB’’ < 0). While the marginal benefit function is assumed to be strictly concave, the 
firm’s collaboration cost function is expected to be linearly increasing or even convex. In other 
words, costs are increasing overproportionally when collaboration intensity increases (C’ > 0 
and C’’ > 0). In equilibrium the firm engages in collaboration projects only if the expected 
benefits exceed expected cost. This yields a return function R that follows an inverse-U shape, 
that is R’> 0 and R’’< 0. This leads us to hypothesize that 
H1: The relationship between the share of collaborative projects in total innovation 
projects and innovation performance follows an inverted-U shape.   
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the marginal benefit, the marginal cost, and the net return 
curves. While abstracting from inherent uncertainty in both these aspects, the firm’s optimal 
collaboration intensity is given by the share of joint projects in total innovation project JP*. In 
a real-world context characterized by information asymmetries, uncertainty, and other 
managerial frictions, we expect that most firms may not choose the theoretically optimal 
collaboration intensity. In other words, we expect to see firms engaging in a whole range of 
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collaboration intensities below and above the turning point in our data. Thus, the purpose of the 
following empirical exercise is to identify the turing point JP* taking into account firms’ 
heterogenity. 
  
Figure 1: Optimal collaboration intensity  
 
3. GAINS, PAINS, AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY 
The extent to which firms benefit from increasing their collaboration intensity depends on 
the relative size of the marginal transaction and disclosure costs compared to the marginal 
benefits through learning, pooling complementary skills, and resource sharing. The optimal 
share of collaborative projects in all innovation projects may therefore be highly firm-specific. 
Smaller firms which may have limited resources, especially for R&D projects (Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott 2011a), may gain relatively more from pooling resources with external partners by 
allowing them to expand their asset and knowledge base. At the same time, however, smaller 
firms’ marginal costs of handling collaborative projects may be higher than in larger firms. 
Indeed, responses to the survey on which this study is based indicate that coordination costs are 
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among the main factors that prevent firms from engaging in (new) collaborative projects. 
Interestingly, SMEs are significantly more likely to indicate that coordination costs are an 
important deterring factor than larger firms.2 
Overall, the level of resource constraints within a firm may determine the relative costs or 
gains from engaging in additional joint projects (Lavie et al. 2010; Beckman et al. 2004). If a 
firm is not resource constrained, e.g., can hire additional R&D managers and project assistants, 
the benefits of collaborative projects may exceed marginal transaction costs. For instance, Park 
at al. (2002) stress the importance of available resources for realizing opportunities through 
strategic alliances. If resource expansion is impossible, for instance, because of financial 
constraints, current management may not be able to successfully handle collaborative R&D 
projects, thus reducing the returns to every additional project or even rendering the return 
negative.        
A similar argument can be made for young firms with a high learning potential that gain 
through tapping the partner’s experience. Indeed, it has been shown that younger firms are less 
established in their routines and skills, and are thereby more flexible to adapt to new 
environments (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Lavie et al. 2010). However, disclosure and 
transaction costs must be weighed against these gains, potentially reducing the number of 
collaborative projects a firm can handle and still benefit from it overall. Young firms may be 
particularly concerned with disclosing too much of their specific knowledge and consequently 
losing their competitive edge to more established competitors. Moreover, firms’ own 
experience is an important predictor of innovation success through external innovation linkages 
(Love et al. 2014). 
                                                 
2 Based on a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reported that coordination costs constitute a very important 
reason not to enter a (new) R&D collaboration, the test statistic from a one-sided t-test on the mean differences 
between SMEs and larger firms reports that coordination costs are significantly higher for SMEs than for large 
firms Pr(T < t) = 0.0384. As is typically done in the literature, SMEs are defined as firms with less than 250 
employees. 
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More generally speaking, for firms in more competitive environments, knowledge 
disclosure in R&D alliances to other firms may be relatively more costly, leading to a smaller 
optimal share of joint innovation projects. On the other hand, if firms are active in a more 
competitive environment, pooling competences and skills with one or several partners may be 
essential to ensure that they keep ahead of their competition (Lavie et al. 2010).   
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that  
H2: The optimal share of collaborative projects in total projects varies with a firm’s size, 
the level of resource constraints, maturity, and its competitive environment.    
Finally, the diversity or complexity of a firm’s collaboration portfolio may determine the 
extent to which a collaboration will translate into higher innovation performance (Leiponen and 
Helfat 2010; Beck and Schenker-Wicki 2014; van Beers and Zand 2014).  
The complexity of the collaboration portfolio may increase along two main dimensions: 
the number of different types of partners (competitors, suppliers, customers, end-users, 
universities or public research institutions) and the number of stages within the R&D process 
in which collaboration takes place, ranging from idea generation and basic research to applied 
research, product development, and market introduction. With increasing complexity, 
managing collaborations may become increasingly costly. Furthermore, disclosure costs may 
increase with the number of different agents and with the variety of stages in the R&D process 
at which collaboration takes place. Collaboration complexity may limit the marginal returns to 
engaging in additional collaborative projects and may hence lower the optimal share in 
innovation projects, which maximizes the returns to collaboration. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that 
H3: The optimal share of collaborative projects in total projects is lower for firms with a 
higher level of collaboration complexity.      
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4. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY  
We estimate innovation success models in which the share of collaborative projects is our main 
variable of interest. Testing our hypotheses thus requires detailed information on a firm’s 
collaboration activities as well as on its innovation performance. We first consider the event of 
introducing a new product to the market as innovation success. In a second step, we examine 
the market success of product innovations measured by the firm’s sales share from products 
that were new to the market. Third, we account for the conditionality of market success to the 
introduction of new products.  
In a first step, we specify innovation performance as a discrete probability model which we 
estimate using probit models. The sales share due to new products, however, is a percentage 
and hence requires the estimation of a censored dependent variable model, as not every firm in 
our sample has product novelty sales in the period under review. For the second step, we 
therefore estimate Tobit models on new product sales that can be written as: 
yi* = X’ β + ɛ                                            (1) 
where y*i is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent variable is equal to  
                       
*   
0    otherwis
 0
ei
y if X
y
          (2) 
and X represents a matrix of regressors, β the parameters to be estimated and ɛ the random error 
term. However, the standard Tobit model requires the assumption of homoscedasticity in order 
for the estimates to be consistent (see Wooldridge 2002: 533–535). After conducting tests on 
heteroscedasticity (Wald tests and LR tests) using a heteroscedastic specification of the Tobit 
model, we estimated the model by a maximum likelihood function in which we replace the 
homoscedastic standard error term σ with )'exp(  Zi  . In particular, we include five size-
class dummies based on the number of employees and six technology classes (following the 
OECD 2003 classification) to model group-wise multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
13 
 
Finally, we account for the conditionality of a positive sales share on having introduced a new 
product to the market. That is, the outcome variable yi is only observed if a selection criterion 
is met, i.e., if zi > 0, with zi being the probability of the market introduction of a new product 
and yi the relative market success of new product(s). We estimate the impact of collaboration 
intensity on market success, conditional on a firm having introduced at least one new product, 
as follows:  
                                                             
'
1    0
                0 
i i i
i
i
X u if z
y
if z
    
  (3) 
with                                      2i i iz w u      and     1
2
~ (0, )
~ (0,1)
u N
u N
  (4) 
and 1 2( , )corr u u  . This approach allows us to take the error term correlation into account 
(see Heckman 1976, 1979). Indeed, if ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to (3) would 
yield biased results; upwards biased in case of a positive error term correlation and downward 
biased in case of a negative error term correlation. The model proposed by Heckman accounts 
for such error term correlation by restoring the zero conditional mean through including an 
estimate of the selection bias. This procedure further allows us to take the censoring of our 
second stage outcome variable into account, that is, the truncated nature of the sales share from 
new products.  
5. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The following analysis makes use of the 2012 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 
covering the period 2009–2011. The MIP started in 1993 with the aim to provide representative 
innovation data for policy and research purposes. It is the German part of the European-wide 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) and thus provides internationally comparable data. The 
sample population is representative of all firms with at least five employees in the German 
business sector. The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas Institut für 
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Sozialforschung, and ISI Fraunhofer Institute conduct this survey on behalf of the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research. For a detailed description of the survey, see Peters 
(2008). We complemented this data with information on the firms’ legal forms and the founding 
year as well as the firms’ credit ratings from the Creditreform database. Creditreform is 
Germany’s largest credit rating agency and provides firm-level information for nearly the entire 
population of firms in Germany. As a measure of firms’ competitive environment, we obtained 
sales concentration indicators at the 4-digit NACE level from the German Monopolies 
Commission. The present study focuses on the information of 2,735 firms in manufacturing and 
business-related industries that had at least 10 employees in 20093 (see Table A.1 in the 
Appendix for the sample distribution across industries).  
Innovation performance measures 
The binary indicator (new product) takes the value one if a firm introduced at least one new 
product to the market (zero otherwise). This variable serves as an outcome variable in the probit 
model and in the first stage of our selection model. To measure market success, firms indicated 
the share in sales from these new products (new product sales). Since only firms with new 
products can have positive sales, this variable serves as an outcome variable in the Tobit model 
and in the second stage of the selection model. 
Innovation projects and collaboration measure 
Firms indicated the total number of innovation projects (# all projects) as well as the number 
of innovation projects in collaboration with external partners (# joint projects) during the period 
2009–2011. From that information, we can calculate collaboration intensity as: 
# joint projectscollaboration intensity 
#  all projects
  
                                                 
3 We drop all firms that classify as micro firm according to the European Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of May 6, 2003, from the sample.    
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To capture non-linarities in the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation, we 
include the squared values for collaboration intensity in addition to the original variable in all 
models. 
Moderating factors 
Both the likelihood of introducing a new product as well as its share of total sales may depend 
on firm size. We therefore include a firm size measure (firm size), i.e., the number of employees 
in all models. Since, the relationship may not be linear, we define size classes that distinguish 
small firms with less than 50 employees from medium-sized (> 50, but < 150 employees), and 
larger firms with more than 150 employees. We also define an SME dummy that takes the value 
one if the firms have 250 or fewer employees (SME). To account for the fact that financial 
constraints may play an important role in choosing the optimal number of collaborating 
partners, we include a measure for the level of financial flexibility. This measure is based on a 
firm’s credit rating index (credit rating). The index issued by Creditreform, Germany’s largest 
credit rating agency, ranges from 100 (best) to 600 (worst) and banks, customers, and suppliers 
frequently use it.4 Firms’ age is obtained from the Creditreform database and is measured as 
the count of years since the founding year. As previously mentioned, the maturity of a firm may 
determine the optimal collaboration intensity and young firms in particular may differ not only 
in their learning potential, but also in their capacity to handle alliances. Since the effect is likely 
to be non-linear over different stages of maturity, we construct four age classes with the 
youngest firms being less than seven years old (see Table 2). To take the impact of the 
competitive environment into account, we use a measure for sales concentration, i.e., the sales 
share of the 15 largest companies at the sector-level. The higher the value of this indicator, the 
more concentrated the sector in which firm i operates.  
                                                 
4 See Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b) for more details on the construction of the index. 
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As previously argued, the impact of an additional collaboration may depend on a firm’s current 
collaboration complexity. Building on van Beers and Zand (2014), who stressed that 
collaboration diversity is multidimensional, we measure collaboration complexity based on the 
number of different partner types and the number of different stages of the innovation process 
at which firms collaborate (see Table 1). Previous studies have analyzed the former dimension 
in its impact on innovation performance (see e.g., Faems et al., 2010; Beck and Schenker-Wicki 
2014) but have not paid attention to further complexity-shaping dimensions. Information on the 
collaboration partners and the stages at which firms collaborate is obtained directly from the 
innovation survey. Table 1 shows the 6 x 5 matrix on which firms indicated what type of partner 
they collaborate with and at which stage of the innovation process those projects take place. 
Table 1: Collaboration complexity matrix (in percent of collaborators) 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
  idea 
generation 
research/prototyping applied 
research/design
development/testing market 
introduction 
Type 1 Universities/PROs 71.79 52.54 37.17 26.53 16.50 
Type 2 Input suppliers (raw 
materials) 
22.22 32.77 36.65 26.53 26.21 
Type 3 Suppliers (machines 
/software/consulting)
5.13 9.04 16.23 18.37 21.36 
Type 4 Customers 0.85 5.08 9.95 22.45 18.45 
Type 5 End-users 0 0.56 0 4.76 12.62 
Type 6 Competitors 0 0 0 1.36 4.85 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 
  
The composite indicator collaboration complexity is then calculated as: 
5 6
1 1
 
 
 
s t
collaboration complexity stages types . 
For example, a firm that collaborates with universities at the idea generation stage and at the 
prototyping stage has a complexity value of 2 (stages) x 1(partner) = 2. If it also collaborated 
with customers at the market introduction stage, the value would change to 3 x 2 = 6. 
Alternatively, a firm that collaborates with six different partners, but always in the market 
introduction phase, would also have a value 6 x 1 = 6. The logic is that complexity increases 
over-proportionally with the number of different stages and different types of partners. The 
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average value for collaborating firms in the sample is about seven, the median is six, and the 
maximum value is 30. 
Control variables 
We follow the literature and control for a series of firm characteristics that have been shown to 
impact innovation performance (see e.g., Peters 2009; Un at al. 2010). Since R&D is the most 
important input in the innovation production equation, we control for the firm’s R&D intensity 
(R&D intensity), measured by R&D expenditures, divided by sales. To capture different 
exposure to international product markets, which affects both the pressure to innovate and the 
potential market size for the new product, we also include the firm’s export intensity (Export 
intensity). We further account for the firm’s ownership structure by including a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the firm has a part of a national enterprise group (national group) and a 
dummy variable that captures multinational enterprises (MNE). We further distinguish firms 
according to their legal status as indicated in the credit reform database (private, limited liability 
and public companies). In addition, we control for structural regional differences between 
eastern and western Germany (east) and we include a set of 25 industry dummies that capture 
the differences in technological opportunities between sectors (see Table A.1 in the Appendix 
for details). 
Finally, for identification reasons we need at least one independent variable that appears in the 
selection equation but does not appear in the outcome equation, that is, we need a variable that 
affects the probability of introducing a new product, but not the share of novelty sales in total 
sales (Sartori 2003). In our case, the firms’ product portfolio diversification serves as an 
exclusion restriction that meets this condition. More precisely, firms indicate the share in sales 
that can be attributed to the single biggest product (diversification). The larger that value, the 
more concentrated a firm’s product portfolio, and the smaller, the more diverse it is. The 
variable enters the first stage significantly, since a more concentrated product portfolio 
negatively affects the likelihood of new products. Once firms decide to launch market novelties, 
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the market success of the latter is not driven by the diversification of the overall product 
portfolio. We test the validity of the exclusion restriction by performing a likelihood-ratio test 
(LR chi2(1)  =  12.19, Prob > chi2 = 0.0005) which supports the choice of this variable. 
Timing of variables 
Our data structure is cross-sectional. That is, we observe both collaboration projects and 
innovation performance during the same period (2009–2011). The advantage of this 
measurement is that it accounts for the fact that collaborative projects usually last longer than 
a single year. The drawback is that we consider only the short-run effects of these projects on 
innovation performance. Likewise, most of the time-varying control variables refer to this 
period.  
Sample characteristics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables. About 14% of the firms in the 
sample have introduced a new product to the market and the average sales shares from these 
new products is 12%. On average, a firm in our sample had 5.8 innovation projects during the 
sample period 2009 to 2011 of which 1.8 were collaborative. This results in an average 
collaboration intensity of 0.16. Among collaborators, the collaboration intensity is naturally 
much higher with about 0.60. Approximately 74% of collaborating firms had more than one 
collaborative project and about 7% had more than 10. Roughly 12% of the firms undertake 
more than 60 percent of their projects in collaboration and about 8% even conduct all their 
innovation projects in collaboration. On average, a firm in our sample has 218 employees. This 
high average firm size in our sample does not reveal that approximately 80% of the firms have 
around 250 employees, i.e., are SMEs and the median firm has 41 employees. The average 
credit rating score is 228 and the average age 35 (median is 22). Firms have an R&D intensity 
of 3.2%, and an export intensity of 15%, on average. Finally, about 16% of the firms are part 
of a national enterprise group and around 15% are part of a multinational enterprise group. 
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Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the cross-correlations between variables. As expected, we 
see that there is a positive correlation between the introduction of a new product (or new product 
sales) and collaboration intensity as well as for several of the control variables, such as R&D 
intensity, export intensity, and the number of employees. Among the control variables, 
correlations are low to moderate.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (2,735 obs.) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Innovation indicators    
new product sales§ ratio 0.124 0.150 0 0 1 
new product  count 0.139 0.346 0 0 1 
Collaboration indicators    
# all projects count 5.822 43.259 0 0 1,500 
# joint projects count 1.758 14.407 0 0 500 
collaboration intensity ratio 0.161 0.316 0 0 1 
Moderating factors       
# Employees count 217.735 1,028.106 41 10 32,400 
   < 50 employees dummy 0.551 0.497 1 0 1 
   51–150 employees dummy 0.247 0.431 0 0 1 
   > 150 employees dummy 0.202 0.401 0 0 1 
SME dummy 0.865 0.342 1 0 1 
Credit rating index 228.254 50.683 222 100 600 
   < 200 points dummy 0.252 0.434 0 0 1 
    201–330 points dummy 0.725 0.447 1 0 1 
   > 330 points dummy 0.023 0.150 0 0 1 
Age count 34.712 37.943 22 1 681 
   <7 years dummy 0.067 0.251 0 0 1 
   8–15 years dummy 0.166 0.372 0 0 1 
   16–35 years dummy 0.486 0.500 0 0 1 
   > 35 years dummy 0.280 0.449 0 0 1 
Sales concentration ratio ratio 0.748 0.169 0.773 0.520 1 
Collaboration complexity* index 7.394 6.255 6 0 30 
Control variables       
R&D intensity ratio 0.032 0.317 0 0 13 
Export intensity ratio 0.149 0.248 0 0 1 
National group dummy 0.156 0.363 0 0 1 
MNE dummy 0.149 0.357 0 0 1 
Private dummy 0.144 0.351 0 0 1 
Limited dummy 0.818 0.386 1 0 1 
Public dummy 0.038 0.191 0 0 1 
East dummy 0.361 0.480 0 0 1 
Diversification ratio 73.250 23.709 80 1 100 
Notes: §based on firms that introduced a new product. *based only on collaborating firms. 
6. RESULTS 
We next proceed to the regression results of the impact of collaboration intensity on innovation 
performance. The left-hand side of Table 3 presents the results of the probit model. 
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Collaboration intensity and its squared value are both significant. First, collaboration intensity 
enters positively. The negative sign of the second-order term, though, suggests that the positive 
relationship between collaboration intensity and new products decreases or even turns negative 
for high collaboration intensities. Given the non-linearity of the probit model, the coefficient 
on the second-order term of collaboration intensity does not provide the change in the partial 
effect of the intensity variable (Greene 2010). Thus, we cannot derive the marginal effect of the 
second-order term from the estimated coefficient, but need to calculate the marginal effect of 
collaboration intensity on Pr(new product) at different values of the distribution of collaboration 
intensity. As suggested by Greene (2010), we perform a hypothesis testing based on the 
estimated coefficients and infer the magnitude of the effects by calculating the marginal 
predictions and average marginal effects. Figure 2 illustrates the results from these calculations 
graphically. The left-hand side shows the predictive margins and the right-hand side the average 
marginal effects over the range of possible collaboration intensities. We see that the probability 
of new products increases with collaboration intensity until it reaches a point where an increase 
in collaboration intensity has no effect on Pr(new product). Indeed, from about 20% total 
collaborative projects the innovation projects’ returns start to decrease. At 60% of collaboration 
intensity, the marginal impact of innovation probability even turns negative for every higher 
value of collaboration intensity. The right-hand side shows the derivative, that is, the slope of 
the predictive margins curve and illustrates that the returns to increasing collaboration intensity 
start to decline at around 20% of collaborative project, but is still in the positive range until it 
reaches the 60% threshold. These results are confirmed in the Tobit models on new product 
sales on the right-hand side of Table 3 (Model 2). Indeed, when calculating the curve’s turning 
point, we find the extreme value (maximum) to also be at around 60%, confirming the inverted-
U shape in the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation performance 
(Hypothesis 1). Finally, several of the control variables enter the innovation equation 
significantly. Being part of a national group is positively associated with new product 
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introduction, but not with new product sales. Similarly, the group of largest firms is more likely 
to introduce a new product, but their new product sales share is not significantly higher than 
those of smaller firms. Private and limited liability companies tend to be less innovative 
compared to public ones. Young firms are more likely to have a product innovation and the 
competitive environment matters for both new products and new product sales.  
Table 3: Probit and heteroscedastic-robust Tobit estimations (2,735 obs.) 
                                   Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. s.e. Coef.   s.e. 
Collaboration intensity 4.271 (0.283) *** 0.697 (0.107) *** 
(Collaboration intensity)2 -3.495 (0.298) *** -0.550 (0.123) *** 
R&D intensity -0.005 (0.050)  0.010 (0.036)  
Export intensity 0.141 (0.164)  0.036 (0.023)  
National group 0.021 (0.004) *** 0.009 (0.024)  
MNE 0.213 (0.199)     0.034 (0.031)  
# Employees     
   51–150 employees 0.013 (0.059)     0.036 (0.057)  
   > 150 employees 0.199 (0.000) *** 0.043 (0.036)  
Credit rating      
   201–330 points -0.059 (0.055)     -0.015 (0.007) ** 
   > 330 points 0.221 (0.291)     0.063 (0.029) ** 
Private -0.135 (0.047) *** -0.050 (0.002) *** 
Limited -0.074 (0.034) **  -0.035 (0.001) *** 
East 0.053 (0.110)     -0.004 (0.021)  
Age     
   8–15 years 0.102 (0.012) *** 0.002 (0.002)  
   16–35 years 0.123 (0.191)     -0.009 (0.021)  
   > 35 years 0.012 (0.225)     -0.020 (0.027)  
Concentration 10.047 (2.751) *** 3.870 (1.796) ** 
(Concentration)2 -6.367 (1.452) *** -2.462 (1.123) ** 
Complexity 0.058 (0.003) *** 0.008 (0.001) *** 
Industry dummies  yes yes 
Turning point 0.611 0.634  
Log likelihood -686.536 -301.890  
Lind/Mehlum test5 - 20.79**  
Notes: Both models contain a constant. Industry dummies included, not presented. *(**,***) indicate 
10% (5%, 1%) significance. 
 
                                                 
5 Lind and Mehlum (2010) argue that coefficient signs and significance (in addition to checking whether the 
extreme value is within the variable’s range) is not sufficient to support (inverted) U relationships even in linear 
models. While very common in the literature, problems with this type of inference arise when the true relationship 
is concave (or convex) but monotone over relevant data values. Therefore, we perform the “appropriate U-test” 
that the authors suggest to test for the slope of the curve at several points in a linear OLS model. In our case, the 
estimated maximum is well within the data range. Accordingly, the t-test statistic clearly supports the hypothesis 
of an inverted-U relationship (see Lind and Mehlum 2010 for the technical details). 
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Figure 2: Predictive margins and average marginal effects of collaboration intensity on 
product innovation success (Model 1; 95% confidence intervals)  
 
Table 4 presents the results from the selection models as outlined in Section 3. Column two 
shows the results from the first stage, that is, the probability of having a new product, and 
column three displays the second stage results. We see that the mills ratio is highly significant, 
underlining the appropriateness of the Heckman selection procedure. Compared to the results 
presented in Table 3, we see that the second stage effects are indeed slightly smaller for the full 
sample, but still show the same pattern and statistical significance. The maximum is still around 
62% of collaborative projects in total innovation projects, thereby underlining the robustness 
of this result (see also Figure A.1 for a graphical illustration of the marginal effects on new 
product sales). Next, we explore how firm heterogeneity impacts this relationship. For that 
purpose, we re-estimate the baseline model (Model 1 of Table 3) and calculate the marginal 
effects of collaboration intensity on innovation success not only at different values of 
collaboration intensity, but also for different types of firms, varying the firm characteristic of 
interest while holding all other variables constant. The estimation results of the heterogeneity 
analyses are shown in Figure 3, where the predictive margin curves for the various cases are 
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shown. The slope of the curves indicate the changes of increasing collaboration intensity on 
Pr(new product).  
Table 4: Heckman section models (two-step estimation; 2,735 obs.)   
 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Pr(new product = 1) new product sales % 
Variable    Coef.    s.e.     Coef.          s.e.  
collaboration intensity  3.662 0.480 *** 0.435 0.203 ** 
(collaboration intensity)2  -3.083 0.445 *** -0.354 0.171 ** 
R&D intensity -0.008 0.088  0.202 0.032 *** 
Export intensity 0.161 0.168  0.094 0.035 *** 
National group 0.042 0.118  0.006 0.024 
MNE 0.220 0.113 * 0.016 0.025 
# Employees     
   51–150 employees -0.005 0.105  -0.065 0.022 *** 
   > 150 employees 0.155 0.123  -0.072 0.026 *** 
Credit rating     
   201–330 points -0.052 0.097  -0.015 0.019  
   > 330 points 0.208 0.272  0.041 0.058  
Private -0.160 0.228  -0.019 0.047  
Limited -0.104 0.177  -0.025 0.032  
East 0.058 0.088  -0.017 0.018  
Age     
   8–15 years 0.094 0.175  -0.055 0.034  
   16–35 years 0.106 0.161  -0.086 0.032 *** 
   > 35 years -0.025 0.177  -0.073 0.035 ** 
Concentration 10.322 5.620 * 2.527 1.254 ** 
(Concentration)2 -6.595 3.689 * -1.661 0.826 ** 
Complexity 0.513 0.072 *** 0.067 0.027 ** 
exclusion restriction: diversification -0.006 0.002 ***    
Industry dummies  yes   yes 
Wald Chi2(42) 159.62*** 
Mills ratio (lambda) 0.154** (0.069) 
Notes: Both stages contain a constant. Industry dummies included, not presented. *(**,***) indicate 10% (5%, 1%) 
significance. 
 
Firm heterogeneity results  
For testing Hypothesis 2, we first estimate the impact of firm size on the relationship of 
collaboration intensity on innovation performance. To start, we estimate whether the 
collaboration threshold is different for SMEs compared to larger firms. As can be seen in the 
first panel of Figure 3, the threshold is slightly larger for SMEs than for larger firms. While 
large-size firms have a turning point at around 50% of collaborative projects in overall projects, 
for SMEs this point is at circa 65%. These results can be viewed in line with predictions by 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), who find that it may be advantageous for larger firms to integrate 
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vertically rather than to engage in additional alliances. Given that in our sample we have 
predominantly SMEs, in the second panel we further test for a more fine-grained disaggregation 
of firm size, as displayed in the descriptive statistics in Table 2. We see that in this case, no 
significant differences exist between firms smaller than 50 employees, from 51 to 150 
employees or larger than 150 employees. We can thus conclude that size only has a significant 
impact on the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation performance when 
differentiating SMEs with larger firms.  
The second test concerns differences in experience, which we proxy by firm age. For that 
purpose, we consider a firm as young if it has existed for less than seven years.6 As we can see 
from the third panel in Figure 3, while the slope is overall flatter for younger firms, they benefit 
significantly longer from increasing their intensity of collaboration. Indeed, while the turning 
point for experienced firms is around 60% of collaborative projects in all projects, younger 
firms benefit up until around a collaboration intensity of 80%.  
Furthermore, we explore whether different levels of financial constraints affect the returns to 
collaborating. We see in the 4th panel that firms with the best credit rating (credit rating from 
201–330 points) experience negative returns from collaboration significantly earlier than other 
firms with a turning point of around 45%. Firms with worse credit ratings benefit from 
collaboration until an intensity of roughly 65%. This finding points to the conclusion that 
collaboration is important for firms with restricted access to loans and trade credit, which may 
therefore experience more constraints to funding innovation projects without a partner.  
Fourth, we distinguish firms in highly competitive markets from those in less competitive 
industries. We use concentration indices to proxy the degree of competition in a particular 
sector. Competition is measured using a cut-off at the 25th and the 75th percentile of the sales 
                                                 
6 We follow the definition of “young,” as used by Schneider and Veugelers (2010). We further checked other cut-
offs in terms of firm age: For higher cut-offs, the difference is less pronounced, and for smaller cut-offs the sample 
of young firms becomes unrepresentatively small.  
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ratio of the 15 largest firms in an industry. As can be seen from the 4th panel of Figure 3, we do 
not find significant differences in returns to collaboration for firms in different competitive 
environments. This result is not very sensitive to the choice of the concentration index and to 
variations in the cut-off criterion. However, we would like to stress that the competition 
measure used here might not reflect actual technological competition which can also be 
technology-based instead of sector-based.  
Finally, we distinguish firms according to their collaboration complexity. As shown by the last 
panel of Figure 3, complexity impacts the effects of collaboration intensity on the introduction 
of new products significantly. Indeed, we see that the slope is steepest and the turning point 
largest (60%) for firms with lower innovation complexity (complexity ϵ [0, 2[). Firms within 
the highest complexity range (complexity ϵ ]8, 30]) are overall more innovative. Nevertheless, 
we see that the inverse-U shape of the curve is flatter, indicting a lower marginal gain from 
increasing collaboration intensity. Firms belonging to the medium complexity range show 
continuously decreasing returns from an additional collaboration intensity. These firms 
perform, on average, better than the firms with lower complexity. However, they do not seem 
to have the necessary capacity to handle higher collaboration intensities with the same return 
as the high complexity collaborators, nor do they benefit as much as firms with very low 
complexity (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we explore heterogeneity in organizational and 
management structure (as stressed by Lavie et al. 2010), which we proxy by ownership structure 
(multinational enterprise, national group, and legal form). However, neither one of these 
characteristics turn out to capture differences in returns to collaboration.7 More detailed 
information on the (R&D) management teams would be desirable to improve these tests. The 
detailed estimation results can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
7 Detailed estimation results available upon request.  
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Figure 3: Predictive margins of collaboration intensity on product innovation success by 
moderating factors 
 
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Before concluding, we test the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity problem 
arising from choosing to collaborate. Some unobserved characteristics that influence the 
probability to engage in collaboration could also influence the sales share in market novelties 
once the collaboration strategy is chosen. It could well be that more innovative firms are more 
likely to choose to engage in R&D collaboration. In this case, collaboration intensity would be 
endogenous in a regression of market novelty sales on R&D collaboration. In order to account 
for this, we estimate an endogenous switching model with a full information maximum 
likelihood method (FIML), by modeling the behavior of firms based on two regression 
equations and a criterion function ܫ௜, that determines the collaboration status of a firm i: 
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ܫ௜ ൌ 0							݂݅									ߛܼ௜ ൅ ݑ௜ ൑ 0 
 
            ݕଵ௜ ൌ 	ߚଵݔଵ௜ ൅ ߝଵ௜										݂݅						ܫ௜ ൌ 1    (5) 
ݕଶ௜ ൌ 	ߚଶݔଶ௜ ൅ ߝଶ௜								݂݅								ܫ௜ ൌ 0    (6) 
 
with ݕ௝௜ being the dependent variables in the continuous equations; ݔଵ௜	ܽ݊݀	ݔଶ௜	a vector of 
control variables (the same as in the previous equation) and ߚଵ, ߚଶ and ߛ a vector of parameters. 
The correlation coefficient between ε1 and ui is 21 11 2 / u    and the one between ε2i and ui is 
2
1 22 3 / u    . In line with our Heckman equation, the selection equation includes an 
additional variable to improve identification. If ܫ௜ ൌ 1, firmi chooses to collaborate and the sales 
in market novelties is determined by equation (5); otherwise, it is determined by equation (6). 
The first step of this model isolates the exogenous determinates of engaging in an R&D 
collaboration, like firm size, ownership structure, and R&D intensity, as well as an endogenous 
factor, namely the diversification of a firm’s product portfolio likely to influence the choice of 
either collaboration strategy. We employ the share in sales that can be attributed to the single 
biggest product (diversification) as an exclusion restriction. Similar to the logic in the selection 
models, we argue here that the larger the value of diversification the more concentrated the 
product portfolio, which affects the collaboration likelihood negatively. A more diversified 
product portfolio, on the other hand, may provide more opportunities to engage in collaborative 
agreements. The market success of new products should, however, not be influenced. The 
second step, the outcome equation, then provides consistent estimates on market novelty sales 
while accounting for this endogenous selection. As can be gathered from Table 5, accounting 
for the selection into entering a collaboration does not fundamentally change our conclusions. 
We do, however, see that the correlation coefficients are significant. We further find that the 
estimated coefficients of collaboration intensity are smaller if the selection into collaboration is 
taken into account. 
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 Table 5: Endogenous switching model (2,735 obs.) 
 Stage 1  Stage 2 
 Pr(collaboration = 1) new product sales if new product sales if 
Variable Coef. s.e.  Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e.   
collaboration intensity        0.116 0.054 ** 
(collaboration intensity)2        -0.092 0.047 ** 
R&D intensity 16.426 3.489 *** 0.609 0.320 * -0.003 0.010  
Export intensity 0.925 0.139 *** 0.004 0.003  0.007 0.024  
national group 0.088 0.094  0.001 0.001  -0.004 0.011  
MNE 0.178 0.092 * 0.001 0.002  -0.005 0.010  
# Employees       
   51–150 employees 0.137 0.080 * -0.001 0.001  -0.028 0.010 *** 
   > 150 employees 0.548 0.096 *** -0.001 0.002  -0.046 0.015 *** 
Credit rating       
   201–330 points -0.225 0.077 *** 0.008 0.005  0.001 0.061  
   > 330 points -0.620 0.258 ** 0.008 0.005  0.020 0.037  
Private -0.535 0.202 *** 0.002 0.003  0.029 0.035  
Limited -0.071 0.170  0.003 0.003  -0.005 0.018  
East 0.106 0.073  0.002 0.001  -0.016 0.011  
Age       
   8–15 years -0.272 0.156 * 0.005 0.002 ** -0.047 0.035  
   16–35 years 0.223 0.146  0.002 0.001 * -0.061 0.033 * 
   > 35 years 0.201 0.154  0.002 0.001  -0.054 0.034  
Concentration 2.155 6.218  -0.072 0.106  0.996 0.657  
(Concentration)2 -1.344 3.951  0.042 0.064  -0.639 0.421  
Complexity    0.020 0.006 *** 
exclusion restriction: -0.004 0.001 ***     
sigma0 -3.821 0.142 ***       
sigma1 -2.140 0.101 ***       
rho0 -0.017 0.019        
rho1 -0.569 0.226 **       
Industry dummies  yes yes yes 
Log likelihood  4,419.078  
Wald test of independent Chi2(2) = 6.81** 
Notes: Both stages contain a constant and standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. Industry dummies included, not 
presented. *(**,***) indicate 10% (5%, 1%) significance. 
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8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides an empirical analysis to test theoretical considerations suggesting that 
firms can benefit from collaborative innovation projects, but only up to a certain point. It has 
long been shown in the literature that a firm’s innovation success depends not only on internal 
resources, but also on the knowledge it can gather from outside of the firm’s boundaries. While 
the literature has provided ample evidence of the advantages of pooling knowledge and 
resources through R&D alliances, there is scarce literature pointing out that there may be too 
much of a good thing after a certain threshold. To deepen our understanding of the benefits and 
the costs of such alliances, the present study aims at filling this gap by providing evidence that 
the intensity with which a firm seeks external knowledge through partnerships matters. Using 
data of a sample of German firms from the Mannheim Innovation Panel, we show that higher 
collaboration intensities are not necessarily better. Indeed, we find that for high levels of 
collaboration intensity, the initially positive association between new product sales and 
collaboration intensity turns negative. In particular, we find that returns turn negative for 
collaboration intensities larger than 60% which corresponds to the mean collaboration intensity 
in the sample of collaborating firms. Depending on firm characteristics like size, age, level of 
resource constraints, and collaboration complexity, the optimal share of collaborative projects 
ranges from 45% for firms that are financially well-endowed to approximately 80% for young 
firms for which the returns outweigh costs up to relatively high collaboration intensities. 
Depending on the type of firm, the optimal collaboration intensity varies, with a considerable 
number of firms in our sample collaborating beyond their optimal threshold.  
Thus, while collaboration may help firms to innovate, firm-specific transaction costs such as 
coordination efforts, monitoring, and the cost of disclosure, may countervail the benefits from 
engaging in R&D partnerships. The challenge that innovation managers and entrepreneurs face 
is to determine the right collaboration intensity for their firms. Our results challenge the maybe 
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too optimistic view of openness through partnerships as a key component for creating 
inventions and innovative products, thereby provoking a re-think in those firms with high 
collaboration intensities. It seems worthwhile to continuously balance gains against costs and 
adjust collaboration strategies accordingly.  
From a policy point of view, our findings point to the fact that R&D collaborations are not 
innovation-enhancing per se. Exempting R&D collaborations from anti-trust laws intends to 
raise EU firms’ competitiveness. While our results do not undermine that collaboration may be 
a way to achieve this goal, they also depict that this goal may only be achieved if the strategy 
is used wisely and with certain moderation by participating firms.  
This study has some limitations that call for future research. First, the collaboration measure 
used here is rather broad and does not take into account heterogeneity in alliances types and 
contractual arrangements. Different types of collaboration or the location of the partners may 
indeed have different levels of costs and gains attributed to them, which may lead to different 
calibration of the number of external partners that are beneficial to the firm (Giarratana and 
Mariani 2014). Equally important, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to 
take into account the dynamics between collaboration and innovation that occur as firms 
repeatedly engage in collaborative projects. Sampson (2005), for instance, stresses that alliance 
experience matters for returns from collaboration to materialize. It would therefore be 
interesting to see whether the costs and benefits to collaboration change as firms become more 
alliance experienced. Alliance experience could be valuable both in general and with a specific 
partner as trust has been found to predict the successful acquisition of tacit knowledge, which 
may be important for radical innovations (Sherwood and Covin 2008). Moreover, we may not 
capture all benefits and costs, especially when these only occur in the long run, and we suggest 
future research on longer-run alliance portfolio management.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Distribution of firms across industries 
 
Industry   Freq. Percent Cum. 
Mining  49 1.79 1.79
Food/tobacco 122 4.46 6.25
Textiles  94 3.44 9.69
Paper/wood/print 180 6.58 16.27
Chemical  91 3.33 19.60
Plastics/rubber 75 2.74 22.34
Glass/ceramics 61 2.23 24.57
Metal  214 7.82 32.39
Machinery 180 6.58 38.98
Electrical engineering 132 4.83 43.80
Medicine/optic/processing 110 4.02 47.82
Vehicles  74 2.71 50.53
Furniture  69 2.52 53.05
Energy/water/construction 176 6.44 59.49
Wholesale 103 3.77 63.25
Retail  36 1.32 64.57
Transport/post 201 7.35 71.92
Bank/insurance  57 2.08 74.00
IT/telecommunication 103 3.77 77.77
Technical services 174 6.36 84.13
Business-related services 117 4.28 88.41
Other services  251 9.18 97.79
Real estate  33 1.21 98.79
Media   33 1.21 100.00
Total  2,735 100  
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Figure A.1: New product sales and collaboration intensity (selection model) 
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Table A.2: Cross-Correlations (2,735 obs.) 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1 new product 1.000        
2 new product 0.609* 1.000       
3 collaboration 0.403* 0.296* 1.000      
4 (collaboration 0.310* 0.242* 0.969* 1.000     
5 R&D intensity 0.085* 0.146* 0.168* 0.150* 1.000    
6 export intensity 0.271*  0.182* 0.248* 0.187* 0.032 1.000   
7 national group -0.021 -0.027 0.013 0.022 -0.024 -0.068* 1.000  
8 MNE 0.193* 0.081* 0.085* 0.031 -0.014 0.400* -0.180*  
9 # employees 0.163* 0.113* 0.034 0.009 -0.011 0.132* 0.040  
10 credit rating -0.048  0.018 -0.049* -0.032 0.0523* -0.090* -0.064*  
11 private -0.108* -0.069* -0.151* -0.131* -0.035 -0.169* -0.116*  
12 limited 0.064* 0.032 0.120* 0.102* 0.025 0.127* 0.078*  
13 east 0.002 0.012 0.049 0.056* 0.020 -0.147* -0.011  
14 age 0.009 -0.026 -0.038 -0.039 -0.046 0.083* -0.052*  
15 concentration 0.078* 0.047 0.074* 0.060* 0.024 0.102* 0.068*  
16 complexity 0.515* 0.346* 0.553* 0.445* 0.094* 0.321* -0.026  
          
      8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8 MNE 1.000        
9 # employees 0.230* 1.000       
10 credit rating -0.120* -0.133* 1.000      
11 private -0.143* -0.032 -0.016 1.000     
12 limited 0.097* -0.0340 0.085* -0.870* 1.000    
13 east -0.136* -0.098* 0.064* 0.047 -0.005 1.000   
14 age 0.049* 0.074* -0.187* 0.126* -0.140* -0.248* 1.000  
15 concentration 0.083* 0.050* -0.047 -0.125* 0.069* -0.064* -0.025 1.000 
16 complexity 0.233* 0.194* -0.093* -0.123* 0.074* -0.011 0.023 0.076* 
Note: *indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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Table A.3: Probit estimations with firm heterogeneity interactions (2,735 obs.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
collaboration    4.547 ***    3.818 ***    4.441 ***    3.989 ***    5.429 ***    5.650 *** 
                              (0.162)     (0.095)     (0.407)     (0.061)     (0.179)     (0.364)     
(collaboration   -3.615 ***   -3.641 ***   -3.664 ***   -3.440 ***   -4.122 ***   -4.747 *** 
                              (0.109)     (0.062)     (0.377)     (0.028)     (0.194)     (0.370)     
R&D intensity   -0.014       -0.008       -0.006       -0.008        0.024       -0.017     
                              (0.082)     (0.041)     (0.058)     (0.045)     (0.087)     (0.028)     
Export intensity    0.123        0.118 ***    0.146        0.146        0.154 *      0.055     
                              (0.128)     (0.017)     (0.232)     (0.094)     (0.086)     (0.172)     
National group    0.026        0.021 ***    0.030        0.043 ***    0.011        0.006     
                              (0.078)     (0.007)     (0.069)     (0.015)     (0.090)     (0.104)     
MNE    0.214 ***    0.182        0.223        0.217 ***    0.186        0.194 *** 
                              (0.073)     (0.154)     (0.157)     (0.048)     (0.238)     (0.047)     
# Employees         
   51-150 empl.    0.022           -0.001        0.009        0.031       -0.014     
 (0.083)         (0.066)     (0.091)     (0.037)     (0.026)     
   > 150 empl.    0.431 ***        0.183 ***    0.185 ***    0.214 ***    0.104     
                              (0.103)         (0.051)     (0.066)     (0.020)     (0.083)     
Credit rating         
   201-330 points   -0.051       -0.055 *     -0.045       -0.181       -0.051       -0.016     
 (0.072)     (0.029)     (0.072)     (0.111)     (0.101)     (0.090)     
   > 330 points    0.239        0.229 ***    0.230        0.304 **     0.212        0.232     
                              (0.229)     (0.006)     (0.188)     (0.138)     (0.209)     (0.302)     
Private   -0.140       -0.143       -0.160       -0.158       -0.163       -0.105     
                              (0.225)     (0.242)     (0.180)     (0.150)     (0.128)     (0.129)     
Limited   -0.083       -0.074       -0.079       -0.090       -0.105       -0.084     
 (0.324)  (0.440)  (0.131)  (0.253)  (0.208)  (0.166)  
East    0.057        0.057        0.081        0.062        0.062 **     0.066     
                              (0.074)     (0.066)     (0.051)     (0.055)     (0.028)     (0.060)     
Age         
   8–15 years    0.083        0.092            0.120        0.088        0.067     
                              (0.094)     (0.095)         (0.098)     (0.265)     (0.074)     
   16–35 years    0.108        0.111            0.138 ***    0.106        0.097     
                              (0.213)     (0.286)         (0.046)     (0.077)     (0.149)     
   > 35 years    0.006        0.006            0.036       -0.017       -0.058     
                              (0.288)     (0.345)         (0.137)     (0.091)     (0.192)     
Concentration    9.032 **     9.028 ***    9.772 ***    9.548 ***        10.332 **  
                              (3.797)     (1.983)     (2.527)     (1.038)          (5.231)     
(Concentration)2   -5.688 **    -5.715 ***   -6.156 ***   -6.051 ***        -6.570 *   
                              (2.671)     (1.099)     (1.496)     (0.760)          (3.370)     
Complexity    0.057 ***    0.056 ***    0.058 ***    0.058 ***    0.059 ***     
                              (0.004)     (0.003)     (0.008)     (0.004)     (0.005)         
Interaction effects:        
51–150 empl. # 0.238        
 (0.280)        
> 150 empl.#   -1.058 ***       
 (0.106)        
51–150 empl. #   -0.335                        
                                (0.285)                        
> 150 empl. #    0.472***                     
                                (0.126)                        
SME    -0.502***     
                                 (0.105)        
Continues next page…        
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…continued       
SME # collab     0.658***     
                                 (0.088)        
SME # (collab     0.059        
                                 (0.104)        
Young      0.065*      
                                  (0.036)       
Young # collab     -2.031***    
                                  (0.356)       
Young # (collab      2.135***    
                                  (0.423)       
Credit rating 2 #       0.398***   
                                   (0.067)      
Credit rating 3 #       2.447***   
                                   (0.434)      
Credit rating 2 #      -0.065      
                                   (0.071)      
Credit rating 3 #      -4.911***   
                                   (0.619)      
concentration 2        0.443***  
     (0.087)     
concentration 3        0.571***  
                                    (0.137)     
concentration 2 #       -1.134***  
                                    (0.270)     
concentration 3 #       -1.997***  
                                    (0.215)     
concentration 2 #        0.599**   
                                    (0.248)     
concentration 3 #        1.095***  
                                    (0.152)     
Complexity 2         1.743***
                                     (0.100)    
Complexity 3         1.546***
                                     (0.096)    
Complexity 2 #        -5.893***
                                     (0.447)    
Complexity 3 #        -3.807***
                                     (0.541)    
Complexity 2 #         4.524***
      (0.399)    
Complexity 3 #      3.063***
      (0.511)    
Notes: All models contain a constant and industry dummies. Coefficients displayed. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. 
*(**,***) indicate 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. 
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